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Preben Bonnén / Michael Søsted (Aarhus)
The Origin, Development and Perspectives of
Nordic Co-operation in a New and Enlarged
European Union
Die Voraussetzungen für eine Kooperation im Sicherheitsbereich sollten für die nordischen Länder
in vielerlei Hinsicht besser sein als für ganz Europa. Es besteht dort ein Netzwerk für Kontakte und
Kooperationen zwischen Regierungen, Bürokratien, nationalen Parlamenten, politischen Parteien,
Handels- und Arbeitsorganisationen. Die Vereinigung Norden bezieht sich auf Solidarität, gegen-
seitiges Verständnis und grenzüberschreitende Zusammenarbeit. Im Gegensatz zu anderen Formen
zwischenstaatlicher Kooperation  wie SAS, Nordischer Rat, nordische Passunion, nordische
Freihandelszone innerhalb der EFTA  haben es die nordischen Länder im Bereich der Sicherheits-
und Verteidigungspolitik aber nicht zu einer ähnlich intensiven Zusammenarbeit gebracht. Das rührt
auch daher, dass nordische Kooperation traditionellerweise innerhalb eines breiteren europäischen
(und transatlantischen) Rahmens am besten funktioniert hat. Damit die nordischen Länder ihre Mög-
lichkeiten innerhalb der EU besser nutzen, ist es nötig, dass sie eine entspanntere und realistischere
Einstellung gegenüber der Entwicklung einer gemeinsamen europäischen Sicherheits- und Ver-
teidigungspolitik entwickeln. Solange Dänemark, Schweden und Finnland jedoch ihre so genannte
kollektive nordische Zurückhaltung bezüglich Verteidigung beibehalten, wird es keine optimale
Kooperation innerhalb der EU geben.
1. Introduction1
The word Norden is the customary term
used when referring to the five Nordic or Scandi-
navian countries of Northern Europe.2  Apart
from the special situation of the Finnish-speak-
ing population, language was a major unifying
factor between the Nordic peoples. Religion
(first Roman Catholic, since the 1520s Lutheran)
proved to be another unifying factor (Bonnén/
Søsted 2002). Lesser known, but equally im-
portant factors have been the shared understand-
ing of moral values and the common set of le-
gal principles (Wendt 1981, 11ff.). All in all, it
is possible to speak of Norden as a group of
nations with a common heritage. On the other
hand, Denmark, Sweden and Finland have tra-
ditionally found common ground and unity
through the sharing of interests in the Baltic Sea
while Norway and Iceland have always been
more oriented towards the west. Denmark, Swe-
den and Finland have been more interested in
maintaining their boundaries on land, while
Norway held the Atlantic Sea as its primary area
of interest.
Norden has certain distinct features in respect
to issues of war and peace. The region has a
long record of non-wars, i.e. opportunities in
the area to wage war that have been avoided.
The Nordic region is what could be character-
ised as a pluralistic security community with
stable expectations on peaceful settlement of
conflicts. States within a pluralistic security
community possess a certain compatibility of
core values derived from common institutions,
and mutual responsiveness to the point where
they entertain dependable expectations of peace-
ful change. Security communities arise out of a
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process of regional integration characterized by
the development of transaction flows, shared
understandings and transnational values. These
transaction flows involve the regular, institution-
alised interaction not only of national govern-
ments but of members of civil society as well.
In this view, interaction leads to dependable
exceptions of peaceful change, where states
believe that disputes among members of the
community will not be settled by force. Secu-
rity communities, however, are not defined
merely be the absence of war. They are also
characterised by what is called a we-feeling
or shared identity.3
The common heritage transformed into wide-
spread Nordic co-operation in the 19th century
and reached its zenith during World War I. In
spite of very different experiences during World
War II, Nordic co-operation continued well into
the Cold War. But the bipolar setting of the Cold
War provided a rather rigid framework for the
Nordic countries which curtailed any attempts
to further Nordic co-operation  especially in
the area of security. Despite their shared values
and feelings of solidarity, Nordic countries have
found it difficult to co-operate intensely in the
field of security and defence policy. Whereas
Norden appears as one unit linguistically and
ethnically, the region is divided when it comes
to security and defence issues. A telling exam-
ple of this is the failure of the plans and nego-
tiations in 1948 to establish a Nordic Defence
Community. The projects goal of a common
Nordic defence arrangement proved too ambi-
tious and, in retrospect, quite unrealistic. Soon
after, the Cold War cast its paralysing effect on
the Nordic and European security architecture,
thus making any inter-Nordic security and de-
fence co-operation virtually impossible for dec-
ades to come.
With the end of the Cold War, the rigid bipo-
lar framework gradually dissolved and the ex-
pectations of enhanced Nordic co-operation re-
surfaced. Room for manoeuvre greatly increased
and many anticipated an unprecedented degree
of Nordic co-operation. Indeed, co-operation did
increase in several aspects, but Nordic co-op-
eration failed to reach expectations in the one
area most envisaged. The Norden has not (yet)
fully exploited the possibilities of Nordic co-
operation within the European Union. On the
contrary, Nordic co-operation is hampered by
continuous battles of prestige and short-sighted
gains between individual Nordic countries. This
situation is quite astonishing considering that
there will be no better time to develop Nordic
co-operation. However, changes in Nordic se-
curity must be understood in the context of
broader changes in the political order in Europe.
A central feature of these changes is that the
privileged status of the state is challenged.
However, given their common cultural herit-
age and past experiences this lack of co-opera-
tion seems puzzling and raises several impor-
tant questions. Why has the potential for Nor-
dic co-operation not been fully exploited, and
what barriers exist towards Nordic co-operation
within the European Union? Even if Nordic co-
operation does not function optimally, what
steps towards co-operation have been taken, and
how does Nordic co-operation within the Euro-
pean Union function today? What approach
from Nordic countries can we expect in the fu-
ture? Is there going to be an extension of co-
operation or have we seen the best of it because
Norden has played its role? These are the main
questions this article will address. On the fol-
lowing pages, we will analyse the historical
background with special focus on Nordic co-
operation during the World Wars and the Cold
War in order to establish a framework for dis-
cussing Norden in the post-Cold War system and
Nordic co-operation in the new European set-
ting. This article argues that Norden as a (sub-)
region still has a role to play and can arguably
become a model when it comes to stabilizing
and extending informal regional co-operation.
Before addressing these and other questions, it
is critical to first examine the historical back-
ground and how it relates to the current situa-
tion in and among the Nordic countries.
2. The common Nordic heritage
In spite of close links of culture and kinship,
the centuries immediately after the Viking pe-
riod witnessed the emergence of three states,
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which soon began to compete for influence
within the Nordic region. The three states were
Denmark, which at that time also included the
southern region of present Sweden (Skåne,
Halland and Blekinge); Norway, including ar-
eas which later became parts of Sweden, as well
as the Faeroe Islands, Iceland and Greenland;
and finally, Sweden together with Finland. For
centuries, the frontiers of these three states were
fluid and serious conflicts between them were
surprisingly minimal despite numerous minor
wars. In 1380, Denmark and Norway  includ-
ing the Faeroe Islands, Iceland and Greenland
 were united under one king, a situation that
lasted until 1814. In 1389, the Danish born
Queen Margrethe of Norway, who governed
Denmark and Norway after the death of her son,
King Oluf, took over Government in Sweden at
the request of Swedish nobles.
For the first time in history, the entire Nordic
area, which eight years later came to be known
as the Kalmar Union, was united under a sin-
gle political leadership. The Kalmar Union lived
on for 134 years. After the end of the Union in
1523, the Nordic area was divided into two pri-
mary states. The Danish-Norwegian king, who
governed from Copenhagen, ruled over the ar-
eas of Denmark, Norway, the Faeroe Islands,
Iceland and Greenland. The Swedish-Finnish
king in Stockholm ruled in the remaining terri-
tories. The rivalry between Denmark-Norway
and Sweden-Finland led to a number of clashes
covering approximately two centuries of
conflict. Initially, Denmark-Norway was the
stronger of the two political units. However, by
1615 a more even balance between the two
blocks became evident, and in the following
decades the balance of power shifted in Swe-
dens favour.
A series of wars between Nordic countries
ensued. During the rule of King Gustav II Adolf
(16111632) and his successor Queen Christina
(16321654) of Sweden, there was pressure to
expand the frontiers of the kingdom. The first
conquest occurred during the Thirty Years War
in the Baltic region. On two occasions, Sweden
conquered territories from Denmark, first in
164345 and then in 16571660, both of which
squeezed Denmark-Norway out its dominant
position in Norden. The result was the Scandi-
navian War 16751679 that ended indecisively,
and equally little was achieved when Denmark-
Norway in 1709 entered into an alliance with
Russia, Poland and Prussia, Swedens neigh-
bouring rivals. When peace finally came in
1721, the kingdom of Sweden-Finland lost a
good portion of its territories, but surprisingly
Denmark-Norway had not regained any of its
previously lost lands. Subsequently, Denmark
never again regained to the same extent its in-
fluence within the Nordic region.
Ironically, in the years that followed there
appeared no alternative to these former rivals
but to engage in active co-operation. If the Nor-
dic countries wished to maintain some form of
independence in the larger European political
arena, they had little choice but to settle their
differences through peaceful means. The Dan-
ish-Norwegian Foreign Minister of the late 18th
century, A.P. Bernstorff, once remarked, when
commenting on the co-operation agreement
reached by the two powers, that [e]verything
that brings Sweden and Denmark closer to each
other is natural; all that separates them is un-
natural and unreasonable (Bernstorff, quoted
in Bonnén/Søsted 2002). Still, the two countries
fought on opposite sides during the Napoleonic
wars. Denmark, forced by political and eco-
nomic circumstances, forged an alliance with
the French while Sweden allied itself with Brit-
ain for similar reasons. Russia came together
with France in the Treaty of Tilsit (1807) and
occupied Finland since Sweden maintained its
alliance with Britain. In 1809, Finland became
part of the Russian Empire as a Grand Duchy
with extensive internal autonomy. After Napo-
leons defeat at Leipzig, Sweden forced Den-
mark to sign the Treaty of Kiel (January 1814),
under which the King of Denmark ceded Nor-
way to the Swedish King. Following a short re-
bellion, Norway finally became a separate king-
dom under the Swedish Crown.
In the 1840s and 1850s, partly influenced by
German romanticism, many people, especially
students and liberal circles in Denmark and
Sweden, expressed sympathy for a Scandinavian
Union. Up to the 1860s there was talk about a
defence union as well, but the death blow to such
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plans was dealt in 1864 when Sweden and Den-
mark came into disagreement over the defence
of the southern border of Schleswig. In the war
against Prussia and Austria, Denmark was left
alone. Along with the areas of Schleswig, Hol-
stein and Lauenburg, Denmark also lost any faith
it had held in a common Nordic security iden-
tity. Indeed, there was a divergence in percep-
tions of security needs between Sweden and
Denmark over the German threat, with Denmark
far more concerned with the menace due to its
territorial proximity. In June 1905, the Union
of Sweden and Norway came to an end, bring-
ing independence to Norway at last (Weibull
1993, 108f.).
3. The two World Wars and Nordic
co-operation
Bitter experience taught the Nordic countries
that armed conflict only brought disaster and
economic instability, and that Nordic unity could
only be achieved through co-operation and ne-
gotiation. During World War I, Nordic co-op-
eration extended into new areas resulting in
a greater public awareness of the situation. In
many instances, the Nordic area appeared as a
single socio-political and economic unit to many
observers in Europe and North America. In
1918, Finland and Iceland respectively became
sovereign states, and could thereafter make their
own contributions to furthering Nordic co-op-
eration.
In the early post-war years, this co-operation
was strengthened even further. A high-level
network was established for contact and co-op-
eration between governments, officials and na-
tional assemblies, and partially between politi-
cal parties and large trade union organizations.
One of the best indications of this co-operation
was the practice of reserving a seat in the Coun-
cil at the League of Nations for Nordic coun-
tries, which was filled in rotation. Since 1919,
on a popular level the Norden association
contributed to solidarity, mutual understanding
and co-operation across the frontiers, by means
of exchange and sister-town projects (Bonnén/
Palosaari 2002).
A new phase of Nordic co-operation began
in the early 1930s as a result of the global eco-
nomic crisis, the Nazi takeover in Germany and
the growing fear of war in Europe. Meetings of
foreign affairs ministers, as well as ministers for
social welfare, commerce, justice and education
became regular events among Nordic govern-
ments. An important feature of this activity was
a growing Finnish participation in Nordic co-
operation in the field of foreign policy. The out-
break of World War II only heightened this type
of co-operation. Despite fears that different re-
actions and subsequent enforced affiliations of
various Nordic countries during the war would
sever all ties between them, the result was quite
opposite. For example, Finland was not aban-
doned when the country was attacked by the
Soviet Union. During the severe months of the
Winter War, support for the Nordic cause grew
deeper and stronger than ever before. Large
collection drives were started in all Nordic coun-
tries, despite the fact that military aid in the form
of troops could not be provided. However, many
volunteers went to Finland to fight in the Finn-
ish army.
With the German attack on Denmark and
Norway on April 9, 1940, Nordic co-operation
and relationships in general were abruptly sev-
ered. External conditions for individual Nordic
countries differed widely, with Denmark and
Norway being occupied by Germany, the Brit-
ish occupying Iceland and the Faeroe Isles, while
Sweden remained neutral. For its part, Finland
allied itself with Germany from 1941 to 1944
against the Soviet Union. However, despite the
many obstacles imposed by the war, Nordic soli-
darity flourished as never before. The emotions
generated by the war provided fertile soil for
Nordic activities in the post war years.
4. The Norden and the Cold War
All the Nordic countries realized that the dif-
ficult war period made co-operation more nec-
essary than ever. The attempts to create a Nor-
dic defence alliance and keep the region out of
the incipient Cold War failed. Due to their ex-
periences during the war, Denmark and Norway
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joined NATO in 1949, Sweden and later Fin-
land pursued a neutrality policy. Finland was
bound by the Treaty of Friendship, Co-opera-
tion and Mutual Assistance from 1948 with the
Soviet Union, which introduced some limita-
tions on Finnish foreign, security and defence
policy. The possibility of a Finnish inclusion into
the Soviet system of bilateral, all-inclusive po-
litical and military affiliation via the treaty was
perceived as a threat to Swedish, Norwegian and
Danish security. Nevertheless, the Nordic region
developed a unique political identity in the bi-
polar European security order (Lodgaard 1992,
283). In contrast to the rest of the Cold War sys-
tem, Nordic countries tried to pursue foreign
policy orientations which modified confronta-
tion, essentially limiting Soviet Union involve-
ment in Finland and US involvement in Nor-
way (Wiberg/Wæver 1992, 23ff.).
Icelands accession to NATO in 1949 required
neither the establishment of an Icelandic armed
force, nor the stationing of foreign troops in the
country during peacetime. However, the tower-
ing Soviet threat and growing world tension
caused Icelands leaders to think otherwise. Ice-
landic officials concluded that membership in
NATO was not a sufficient deterrent and, at the
request of NATO, Iceland entered into a defence
agreement with the United States. The level of
tension was therefore lower in Northern than in
Central Europe and the Nordic area tried to
shield itself from recurrent conflict manifesta-
tions on the Central Front. In the Nordic region
there was a high enough degree of co-opera-
tion, common cultural traits and We-ness to
legitimise the full use of the term security com-
munity (Deutsch 1957; Palosaari 2001). The
standard explanation of the Nordic case derived
from this view has also had an impact on Nor-
dic self-understanding (Joenniemi 1997, 193ff.).
In contrast to the rest of the system, Nordic coun-
tries tried to pursue a foreign policy orientation,
which represented a modification of confronta-
tion, often referred to as the Nordic Balance,
essentially by limiting Soviet involvement in
Finland and US involvement in Norway.4
At the same time it is worth noting impedi-
ments to closer Nordic co-operation that were
not related to the Cold War system in Europe.
Old, controversial questions appeared from time
to time concerning the union between Denmark,
Norway and Sweden that were still able to mo-
bilize and divide public opinion. Several dec-
ades after 1945, disputes over records contin-
ued between Denmark and Norway, especially
over the traditional and agreed upon Norwegian
fishing and hauling rights in Greenland (Bon-
nén/Metzsch 2002a). In addition, Norwegian-
Swedish relations focused on past military and
political glories and accomplishments. This was
not only due to differing security policies of the
two countries but also to the repercussions from
ethnic and state tensions during and prior to
World War II. As for the former relationship
between Norway and Finland, Norway viewed
the Finnish Danger, associated with the size-
able Finnish settlement in Finnmark and Troms
during 185060 as a point of contention. Instead
of soothing fears, Finland further aggravated the
situation by openly calling for certain frontier
rectifications on the basis of nationality.
Many factors contributed to ambivalence
among Nordic countries, which in turn hindered
development of a common security and defence
policy. One reason for this was that states in a
way pulled out of such Nordic activities and
Nordicity was set free for more popular en-
deavours such as Nordic associations. The fail-
ure of the Nordic defence co-operation provides
a telling example. It was the final common state-
oriented security effort for years to come. Dif-
ferent foreign policy traditions, military and
economic differences, and the different geopo-
litical positions of countries were to make Nor-
dic defence co-operation unthinkable for a long
time (Wahlbäck 2000).5  Nordic countries lim-
ited themselves to co-operation on matters re-
lating to economics, the labour market and other
aspects of low politics.
5. The alternative or limited Nordic
co-operation
Co-operation between members of the Nor-
dic parliaments dates back to the establishment
of the Nordic Interparliamentary Union in 1907.
This was largely a club without any decision-
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making powers or rules for admission (Balders-
heim/Ståhlberg 1999, 5). The Nordic Council
was established in 1952 with members of par-
liament from Denmark, Norway and Sweden as
well as Iceland. In contrast to the supra-
national European Coal and Steel Community
(ECSC) which was founded at about the same
time on the continent, the Nordic Council was
clearly established as an inter-state body
(Sundelius/Wiklund 2000, 325).
Finnish members of parliament joined in
1955/56, after the Soviet Union agreed to re-
turn the Porkkala military base (near Helsinki)
to Finland and thus give the country more lee-
way in its foreign relations. In explaining the
decision to parliament, the Finnish government
declared that the Nordic Council would deal
mostly with administrative, social and economic
questions. Should the Council  against its es-
tablished practice  debate military questions
or discuss statements concerning the conflict
between the superpowers, the Finnish repre-
sentatives would not participate in such debates
(Andrén 2000, 281). The Helsinki Treaty of
1962 based the Nordic Council on an interna-
tional agreement. The reason for establishing a
legal basis was the attempt of Denmark and
Norway to join the European Economic Com-
munity. The Helsinki Treaty should secure the
achievements of Nordic co-operation (see
Wiklund 2000). In 1970, the self-governing ar-
eas of the Faeroe Islands and Åland got their
own representatives in the Council, while Green-
land got them in 1984.
The Nordic Council consists of 87 elected
members, appointed each year by the parlia-
ments of member countries and the peoples
representations of the autonomous areas. The
delegations are composed according to the par-
liamentary strength of the political parties in
their respective countries. Ministers of the Nor-
dic countries can participate in the meetings of
the Nordic Council, albeit without the right to
vote. The Nordic Council is not a body with
independent powers of decision-making, its
main tasks are the exchange of information and
ideas among Nordic members of parliament. It
enables parliamentarians to take initiatives that
are then voted on in the Council and forwarded
to the governments of Nordic countries. In or-
der to become effective, the recommendations
have to be enacted by parliaments of the respec-
tive countries.
It took some time before the governments of
the Nordic countries established a formal co-
operation body. The Nordic Council of Minis-
ters was established as late as 1971 as an inter-
governmental body. The Council includes min-
isters from the five Nordic countries and the
three autonomous areas (Greenland, the Faeroe
Islands and Åland). The Nordic Council of Min-
isters meets in some 20 different formations
according to the topics debated (the ministers
for education, culture, environment, agriculture,
etc.). Each country has appointed a government
member, known as Minister of Nordic Affairs,
who is directly responsible under the Prime
Minister for the co-ordination of Nordic issues
in their country and for the Councils activities.
Decisions made in the Nordic Council of Min-
isters result in accords, conventions or other
forms of communal Nordic decisions, which,
most of the time, must be ratified in the mem-
ber countries parliaments.
Some of the achievements of this intergov-
ernmental co-operation include the abolition of
passport controls between Nordic countries and
the establishment of a common labour market
that has incorporated the harmonization of so-
cial and labour legislation. Legislative harmo-
nization has also included family law and in-
heritance legislation as well as regulations con-
cerning commercial transactions. Nordic citi-
zens have also been granted the right to vote in
local elections if they live outside their home
country. In cultural areas, a number of joint
Nordic institutions have been established and
programs to encourage co-operation between
national institutions have been set up. For sci-
entific co-operation, a separate Nordic Research
Council exists, funded by the Nordic Council
of Ministers (Baldersheim/Ståhlberg 1999, 5f.).
As was the case with co-operation on defence
policy in 1949, the good intentions for economic
co-operation were destroyed at the end of the
1950s. In particular, Norwegian industry op-
posed any attempt to create a Nordic customs
union. The Nordic countries instead participated
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in the creation of the European Free Trade As-
sociation (EFTA) founded in 1960 as a response
to the establishment of the European Economic
Community (EEC) by those countries that could
not or did not want to join the EEC.6
Another attempt at deepening economic co-
operation was made between 1967 and 1970,
after French President Charles de Gaulle twice
vetoed British entry into the single market and
with it the membership applications of Denmark
and Norway. Whereas in earlier situations it was
divergences between the Nordic countries that
prevented co-operation, this time it was exter-
nal circumstances that rendered impossible en-
hanced regional Nordic co-operation and the
goal of a customs union.7  In contrast to issues
of low politics, such as trade and the free
movement of people, foreign affairs as well as
security and defence policy had traditionally
been considered off limits at Nordic Council
meetings and in the Nordic Council of Minis-
ters during the Cold War. An exception to re-
fraining from sensitive foreign policy issues has
been the co-operation of the Nordic countries
in the United Nations where they attempted with
considerable success to co-ordinate their vot-
ing behaviour in the UN General Assembly (L.
Wiklund 2000).
6. Norden after the Cold War
The end of the Cold War removed the obsta-
cles for foreign policy and security co-opera-
tion. At the same time, it eliminated one of the
barriers regarded in the past to thwart both neu-
tral Sweden and Finland to join the EU as full
members. In October 1991, the impending eco-
nomic crisis in Sweden caused the government
to abruptly change its integration policy and to
announce an imminent application for EU mem-
bership. Its Nordic partners were not informed
in advance and, especially in Finland, negative
comments on the lack of Nordic solidarity were
made public (Luif 1995, 216). Finland and Nor-
way later also applied for EU membership. Nor-
way as a NATO member having no political
hurdle to pass, was nevertheless barred from
accession to the EU when a small majority of
its population rejected (as in 1972) EU mem-
bership. Thus, there remained two Nordic coun-
tries (Iceland which had not applied for EU
membership and Norway) outside EU integra-
tion, whereas from January 1995 Finland and
Sweden joined Denmark in the Union.
The membership applications and subsequent
accessions to the EU had repercussions on Nor-
dic institutions. At a special session of the Nor-
dic Council in November 1991 it was decided
that Nordic countries should try to actively in-
fluence the developments in Europe. In 1995, a
thorough reform of the Nordic Council was ini-
tiated. Nordic co-operation was regarded as a
bridge between the Nordic EU members and
outsiders. Norden would not be an alterna-
tive to Europe, but a part of European co-op-
eration (Johansson/Larsen 2000, 223).
An example of the influence of Nordic co-
operation on the EU policy of Nordic member
states concerned participation in the Schengen
Convention, which granted the free movement
of persons (abolishment of border controls) for
those EU countries that had signed and fully im-
plemented it. In May 1994, Denmark applied
for observer status in the Schengen regime since
it feared that controls at its border with Germany
could become an obstacle for the free movement
of people. This led to a series of administrative
and political contacts between the other Nordic
countries. At the session of the Nordic Council
in Reykjavik, February 1995, the Nordic prime
ministers decided that in order to maintain the
Nordic passport union, all Nordic states should
participate in the Schengen regime. In June 1995,
Finland and Sweden applied for membership in
Schengen, both like Denmark with the condi-
tion that the Nordic passport union should be
maintained. Iceland and Norway indicated their
interest in participation in the Schengen regime
as well. All five Nordic countries became ob-
servers in Schengen from 1 May 1996. Den-
mark, Finland and Sweden signed the Acces-
sion Treaties on December 1996, on the same
day Iceland and Norway signed Co-operation
Agreements with the Schengen countries.
Thus, the three Nordic EU members became
full participants in the Schengen regime,
whereas Iceland and Norway can fully partake
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in the preparations for decisions, but cannot
participate in the decision making as such. With
this arrangement, the Nordic passport union was
preserved (Andersson 2000, 237f.; Scharf 2000,
38). Finally, the Schengen acquis was put into
force (and passport controls abolished) between
the five Nordic countries and the other EU mem-
ber states (except the Great Britain and Ireland)
on 25 March 1991, after the Nordic states had
implemented all relevant rules and regulations
(Hellberg 2001).
Another significant example of Nordic co-
operation in the EU could be observed during
the Intergovernmental Conference (IGC) that led
to a consolidated version of the Treaty on Euro-
pean Union (TEU), negotiated in Amsterdam
in 1996. The Nordic countries had similar in-
terests in the IGC, all focusing on the environ-
ment, openness and the overall goal of prepar-
ing for enlargement. But rather than appearing
as a united bloc, several Nordic voices were
heard saying essentially the same thing (Tallberg
2002, 460). The voices were emphasizing dif-
ferent details, so that they would not thwart each
others interests. Even if both Denmark and
Sweden gave openness high priority, they went
their separate ways: Denmarks preparations
focused mainly on making Council meetings
open to the media, whereas a Swedish paper
focused on access to documents (Johansson/
Svensson 2002, 352f.).
Good personal relations between negotiating
teams meant that Swedish and Finnish negotia-
tors co-operated rather closely at the IGC. In
addition, the social democratic background of
both foreign ministers led to a joint proposal on
the so-called Petersberg tasks, the only ex-
ception to the rule of mere co-ordination among
Nordic countries at the IGC. When the French
and German foreign ministers presented a pa-
per at the IGC where they suggested an inclu-
sion of the Western European Union (WEU) and
with it a military solidarity clause (Article 5)
into the TEU, the Finnish and Swedish foreign
ministers put forward a memorandum, suggest-
ing the insertion of only military crisis manage-
ment (called Petersberg tasks) into the TEU. As
a consequence, they succeeded in preventing the
inclusion of a common defence clause in the
TEU that would have been detrimental to their
neutrality (Luif 2002, 65).
During the IGC, there was also co-operation
with the aim of influencing the negotiations
among nongovernmental actors, including or-
ganized interest groups and political parties.
There have long existed cross-national networks
of interaction between such actors in the Nor-
dic area, where regional and local authorities
have established links across borders (Johans-
son/Svensson 2002, 351; Sundberg 2001).
In April 1997, the Finnish Prime Minister,
Paavo Lipponen, suggested in a letter to the
President of the European Commission, Jacques
Santer, that the EU develop a strategy for a
Northern Dimension. The main aim of this ini-
tiative was to create peace and stability in the
North of Europe, with one of the objectives be-
ing the strengthening of (economic) relations
between the EU and Russia. In contrast to Fin-
land, Sweden supported more schemes with a
focus outside the EU, such as the activities of
the Council of Baltic Sea States (CBSS). These
different approaches illustrate that there still
exist differing attitudes towards European inte-
gration among Nordic EU member states. Finn-
ish politicians are much more open to a more
federal EU structure, whereas in Sweden the
ruling Social Democrats strongly support inter-
governmental decision-making procedures (Luif
2002, 68f.). Nevertheless, the Northern Dimen-
sion and the CBSS are also expressions of the
Nordic countries activities in the Baltic Sea and
their efforts for an early EU membership of the
Baltic states.
One notable area of co-operation between
Nordic countries has been in the United Nations.
The five states largely succeeded in speaking
with one voice in the UN General Assembly,
the exception being disarmament and nuclear
weapons questions, where the three NATO
members and the two neutral countries often had
different positions. With the end of the Cold War,
even these divergences disappeared. When Fin-
land and Sweden joined the EU, both countries
adjusted their voting behaviour to the main-
stream of the EU. Only in questions where there
was no EU consensus a distinctive stance among
Nordic countries could be established, e.g. con-
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cerning the reform of the UN Security Coun-
cil.8  Nonetheless, the traditional informal co-
operation among the Nordic countries has re-
mained confined to the United Nations.
An important element of co-operation among
Nordic EU member states which is not readily
seen in the public, are the daily informal con-
tacts among civil servants in the different min-
istries. These broad and deep transnational and
transbureaucratic interactions have always
been a significant basis of Nordic collaboration
(Sundelius/Wiklund 2000, 327). A research
project on EU negotiations in networks found
that Swedish civil servants first seek contact with
their colleagues in Denmark, then in Finland and
in Great Britain (Johansson 2002, 87).
The issues that still have not found their full
place in the discussion among Nordics are se-
curity and defence matters. In 1997 the Nordic
Council decided to allow defence ministers to
participate in its meetings and let one of the
ministers report on these issues. But despite sev-
eral initiatives, the defence ministers still can-
not meet officially in the context of the Nordic
Council of Ministers (Andrén 2000, 297).
7. Norden in a new and enlarged Europe
With this experience of Nordic co-operation
both outside and within the EU in mind, one
can make several conclusions regarding sub-
regional co-operation among EU member states.
First, it is important to understand the character
of the EU in relation to its member states. The
EU is multifunctional and discussions engage a
broad range of questions with varying degrees
of importance. In addition, many issues are of a
highly practical nature. Therefore, it is very dif-
ficult for subgroups of EU countries to perma-
nently agree on different issues, either because
they do not have a common, consistent view of
the issues at hand; or because the countries do
not agree on the importance of the single issue,
or because the cultural heritage is not regarded
as that important.
Turning to the more Nordic specific reasons
as to why permanent co-ordination has not ma-
terialized, it is of primary importance to note
that the Nordic region is not fully represented
in the EU. This means that Nordic countries are
split as a bloc, each with its own interests and
approaches towards the EU. There is no con-
sensus as to the overall picture of the EU and
this makes it difficult to co-ordinate policies.
Adding to this situation is the fact that there are
significant differences between Nordic countries
themselves. Having some basic common herit-
age does not mean that the countries have de-
veloped alike in all aspects; quite the contrary,
they have some very divergent characteristics.
For example, the Swedes see themselves as a
traditionally great power that should have in-
fluence on the European scene, whereas the
Danes have more of a small state approach to-
wards European co-operation. Sweden has tra-
ditionally relied on its own military might to
achieve security, whereas Denmark had sought
security though alliances. In the same manner,
both Sweden and Finland are countries made
up of relatively few, but rather large and influ-
ential companies whereas Denmark is charac-
terized by a great number of small and middle-
sized industries.
The consequence of these disparities is a di-
vergence in their perception of European co-
operation. This is amplified by differences in
national attitudes towards European integration
as such (Hansen/Wæver 2002). Nordic EU co-
operation could also be understood as provoca-
tion by non-Nordic EU member states  there
could be the fear of a Nordic bloc. Yet an-
other reason why Nordic countries have not
reached a higher degree of co-operation has to
do with another fact, namely that Norden has
become a vehicle for co-operation vis-à-vis the
external world. Having previously been almost
exclusively focused on internal questions,
Norden has not been transformed into a cen-
tralized, political and state-governed entity. One
of the factors that have made it difficult to in-
tensify or deepen co-operation is perhaps the
political and economic dynamic of the European
Union. Undoubtedly, this is an emerging chal-
lenge that will increase given the fact that Nor-
way is not a member of the EU.
Denmarks, Finlands and Swedens member-
ship in the EU means that more Nordic coun-
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tries have focused their attention on European
co-operation; however, it does not render su-
perfluous continued Nordic co-operation (Bon-
nén/Metzsch 2002b). Despite the different po-
litical affiliations and interests of the Nordic
countries, the member countries have consid-
ered it a strength and an advantage to exchange
information and, if possible, to co-ordinate their
policies. Perhaps more than ever for Norway,
as a non-EU member, the Nordic Council has
become an important vehicle as a means of in-
fluencing the affairs of the EU (Bonnén 2001b,
22). Although co-operation functions outside the
EU framework, it is also important to recognize
that co-operation does not function optimally
within the EU framework itself (Bonnén 2001c,
111).
For a long time, there has not been any insti-
tutionalised co-ordination among Nordic EU
countries, such as the use of preparatory meet-
ings that take place between major EU coun-
tries (most often France and Germany) and the
Benelux countries. By the same token, it has
not been possible to identify any common un-
derstanding nor a joint Nordic voice in Euro-
pean discussions. Nordic countries seem to pur-
sue different agendas based on different percep-
tions of interest without any reference to their
common Nordic heritage. It took several years
before the three Nordic EU member states un-
dertook major attempts in co-ordinating their
positions before the most important EU meet-
ing, that of the Heads of state and government,
the European Council. There used to be prepara-
tory breakfast meetings in which the up-
coming agenda was discussed, to avoid any
unnecessary surprises for Nordic partners
(Sundelius/Wiklund 2000, 342).
The first serious effort at co-ordination was
the meeting of the Nordic Heads of state and
government that took place on 12 October 2001,
in preparation for the informal meeting of the
Heads of state and government in Ghent, 19
October 2001. At the reunion in Helsinki, 4
March 2002, the Finnish Prime Minister Paavo
Lipponen, the Swedish Prime Minister Göran
Persson and the Danish Prime Minister Anders
Fogh Rasmussen prepared the European Coun-
cil in Barcelona (1516 March 2002). The three
prime ministers agreed to send a letter to the
Spanish Presidency wherein they not only de-
manded a fair, general deregulation of the en-
ergy markets, but also emphasized traditional
Nordic topics such as sustainable development
and gender equality in the EU (Månsson 2002).
Yet again, one could also notice the differences
among the three Nordic EU member states.
Lipponen and Rasmussen stressed the impor-
tance of strengthening the European Commis-
sion to protect the smaller European states
against the demands of larger members, whereas
Persson supported a larger role for the Euro-
pean Council and thus more intergovernmental
co-operation and less supranational integration.
As more and more decisions are made by
qualified majority in the European Council, the
voting weights of the Nordic countries are sig-
nificant. Since 1995, they together have exactly
the same voting weight as Germany. This situa-
tion will change with the Nice Treaty, wherein
the voting weights of the three Nordic countries
will diminish vis-à-vis Germany. But provided
that Norway and Iceland one day will become
members of the EU, the five Nordic countries
with a population of 22 million people would
probably have 34 votes while Germany with
more than 80 million inhabitants would only
posses 29. This greatly increases the prospect
of Nordic influence within the European Union
(Bonnén 2002).
8. Concluding remarks
Having focused on some of the barriers to
Nordic co-operation it is of value to discuss the
prospects for Nordic co-operation as well. As
we have seen, the Nordic political leaders are
now aware of their potential for co-operation.
The next EU enlargement (decided at the Co-
penhagen European Council, 1213 December
2002) will bring new challenges as there are,
for example, prospects for a system of group
presidencies. This would enhance the benefit of
sub-regional co-operation and could be a cata-
lyst for more Nordic co-operation, which has not
yet reached its full potential. As mentioned ear-
lier, in the League of Nations the Nordic coun-
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tries shared a permanent seat in the Council
based on an agreement of rotation among them.
If the intention is to strengthen co-operation,
the substance and the forms of co-operation shall
undoubtedly need to be changed and adjusted
according to the ongoing economic and politi-
cal changes in Europe and to international de-
velopments in general. We have witnessed a
long period in European affairs that has focused
primarily on widening and deepening the EU.
The main challenge for Nordic countries seems
to have been how they could be integrated into
the new pan-European web of institutions, in-
stead of building a political identity by being
different from other European states or regions.
Nordic co-operation traditionally functioned
best within a broader European (and transatlan-
tic) framework, and not in a specific Norden-
centric sphere. For Norden to take advantages
of its opportunities within the EU, the Nordic
countries also have to take a more relaxed and
realistic attitude towards the development of a
common European security and defence policy.
Today the Nordic countries have an opportu-
nity that is far from utilized. But as long as Den-
mark, Sweden and Finland perpetuate the so-
called collective Nordic reservation on de-
fence, optimal co-operation within the EU will
be long in coming.
However, the European security architecture
needs not only the support of the Nordic coun-
tries, but also support from the surrounding re-
gion, which inevitably includes the Baltic states.
In relation to this region, Nordic co-operation
has an important role to play as a source of in-
spiration and as a role model in the develop-
ment of a coherent Baltic framework. The Bal-
tic Sea has traditionally been pivotal to the whole
region and the great powers of the given time,
whether it was Denmark, Sweden, Germany or
Russia. After the Cold War a window of oppor-
tunity has opened for a more permanent order-
ing of the region by co-operation in the CBSS.9
Furthermore, CBSS benefits from the fact that
it has focussed on security issues from the be-
ginning. It has a top-down logic much in line
with that of the European Union, a central player
in setting the dominant thinking of todays se-
curity co-operation in Europe.
The correlation in logic between the Baltic
Sea co-operation and the EU as well as the op-
portunity to settle security issues around the
Baltic Sea are the reasons why Nordic coun-
tries have pushed so vigorously for the inclu-
sion of Baltic states into the EU. Estonia was
included even in the first small round of enlarge-
ment negotiations agreed upon in Luxembourg
in 1997, so the challenge for Nordic EU mem-
bers was to expand the negotiations to include
Latvia and Lithuania. Denmark stubbornly
pushed for Latvia to be promoted in the first
round of enlargement at the European Council
meeting in Vienna in 1998. The attempt was not
successful, but continuing pressure from the
Nordic EU member states contributed to mov-
ing the matter forward, when the European
Council agreed on the budget at the Berlin sum-
mit, just as the Kosovo crisis demonstrated that
only the prospect of EU membership could once
and for all stabilise the boundaries of the Union
(Friis 2000).
One lesson learned from the Nordic case is
that the absence of conflict and tension in poli-
tics regarding security issues makes informal
sub-regional co-operation in Europe possible.
It is also important to remember that, for the
Nordic countries, internationalisation begins in
the Nordic region itself. Therefore, it must be a
main priority in further European co-operation
that Nordic ideals are projected towards and
promoted in neighbouring countries. Time and
history have proven that these commonly shared
beliefs and values form the very core of all Nor-
dic policies. Undeniably, co-operation being the
most celebrated virtue of them all.
NOTES
1 The authors wish to express their gratitude to Paul
Luif, Austrian Institute for International Affairs, Vi-
enna, Tonny Brems Knudsen, Department of Politi-
cal Science, University of Aarhus, Denmark and
Bjørn Olav Knutsen, Norwegian Defence Institute,
Oslo, for comments and contributions to this article.
Furthermore, a special recognition goes to John
Kristen Skogan, Norwegian Institute for International
Affairs, Oslo, Norway, and Teemu Palosaari, Centre
for European Studies, University of Helsinki, Fin-
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land. Thanks also to Goran Pesic and Robet Momich
for their most important assistance in contributing
material to this article.
2 Of the five Nordic countries, Denmark, Norway, and
Sweden have been inhabited by the same Nordic-
Teutonic race of peoples from the early beginnings
of recorded history. During the main period of the
Viking expansions, Norse settlements were founded
dating to 900 A.D. on the Faroe Islands and Iceland,
in the North Atlantic. About a century after the birth
of Christ, peoples of quite a different race with a dis-
tinct ethnic origin and language began to move across
the Gulf of Finland and into the Baltic countries
(Bonnén 2001a).
3 The standard explanation of the Nordic case derived
from this view, known as never-ending Nordic
peace, has also had an impact on Nordic self-un-
derstanding. This view of security community, ac-
companied with the lack of clearly perceived secu-
rity threats, has been so prevalent, dominant, rigid
and all-encompassing that some analysts have noted
that there actually is no need or room to investigate
alternative explanations on this issue (Deutsch 1957,
58).
4 The concept of the Nordic Balance has been devel-
oped in Norden as an analytical tool for the observa-
tion of security relationships pertaining to the North-
ern European region. The most common understand-
ing of the Nordic Balance differs from normal bal-
ance-of-power concepts. Compared to central Europe
or the Danube region a direct balance of power be-
tween any of the Nordic states did not exist. For the
same reason the Nordic Balance referred to a bal-
ance in the limitation of application of political or
military power. According to Arne Olav Brundtland
(1966, 491ff.), the definition of the Nordic Balance
can be explored further. It can also be considered as
a dynamic term, rather than a static one only. In the
dynamic approach one asks whether there is any dy-
namic linkage between the security policies of the
Nordic countries or not. That such a dynamic inter-
relationship had existed has been observed in sev-
eral crisis situations.
5 The negotiations on Nordic defence co-operation in
1948-49 were initiated in response to the tensions
between East and West and a Soviet thrust against
the North. In Eastern Europe the countries had en-
tered into bilateral military agreements with the So-
viet Union and in the West there were serious con-
siderations on a regular defence alliance among the
Western European countries and the United States
and Canada. Unlike Finland  with its friendship
agreement with the Soviet Union  Denmark, Nor-
way, and Sweden faced the choice of allying with
the West or remaining non-aligned. Iceland had more
or less solved its security issues by accepting the pres-
ence of British troops on her soil in 1940 (Bonnén/
Palosaari 2002).
6 Through EFTA, a free trade area was created among
the Nordic countries. EFTA had a strong stimulating
effect on Nordic trade.
7 First, Charles de Gaulles successor, Georges Pompi-
dou, in 1969 opened up the prospects of expanding
the EC. Second, Great Britain had pointed out that
closer Nordic co-operation within EFTA was not
possible, and third, Finland had announced that it
could not and did not wish to participate (Brundt-
land 1969, 11ff.).
8 The UN representatives of the Nordic countries meet
every week at the level of ambassadors in New York
to discuss matters of common interest. The three EU
members inform Iceland and Norway on the posi-
tions of the EU member states. The meetings enable
the representatives of the EU outsiders to introduce
their own ideas into the EU debate. In addition, elec-
tions for positions in the UN are still co-ordinated
among the Nordic countries. For the non-permanent
seats in the Security Council there exists an informal
rotation scheme among them and as a consequence
almost every other two-year period there is a Nordic
country represented in the Security Council (L.
Wiklund 2000, 256).
9 The CBSS has a role to play as the catalyst of a secu-
rity community much like Norden.
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